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Reacting against Treaty Breaches
Bruno Simma and Christian J Tams

Introduction
States regularly proclaim the sanctity of treaty obligations and few principles are as firmly established as pacta sunt servanda. 1 Yet, treaty breaches are by no means exceptional: adapting
one of international law's most celebrated statements, one might even say that 'almost all nations, almost all the time, consider their rights under a given treaty to be violated:2 By way
of a snapshot, at the time of writing, eleven of fourteen active contentious cases pending
before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) involve claims, by one State, that a certain
treaty has been violated. 3 And this ignores the many treaty breaches that do not reach the
spotlight, but are addressed quietly (eg by means of a phone call between representatives of
the States concerned) or are not addressed at all. Against this background, a recent textbook
is surely right to state that 'most disputes submitted to international adjudication involve
some problem of treaty interpretation.4
The frequency of real or alleged treaty breaches is neither a source for major concern,
nor should it come as a great surprise. While some argue that States today are more cautious before entering into new treaties, especially multilateral ones, the last 150 years have
seen a significant trend towards 'treatificatioii, and treaty commitments have come to cover
ever greater areas of international relations. That some of these commitments should occasionally be breached is only natural: nobody is perfect, and States certainly are not. More
importantly, not all treaty breaches are intentional, or show disrespect for international law
as a system, let alone its ground rule of pacta sunt servanda. Often, breaches result from
mere oversights or lack of information: to give just one example, before States like Paraguay,
Germany, and Mexico were beginning to raise the matter, few people were likely to be aware
of the requirements imposed by the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR)
with respect to consular notification.5 Or, treaty disputes may be due to different, plausible
interpretations of a given treaty commitment-for example, with respect to the scope of an
1 In the introductory lines of its commentary on draft Art 23 (which eventually became Art 26 of the 1969
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)), the International Law Commission (ILC) observed: 'Pacta
sunt servanda-the rule that treaties are binding on the parties and must be performed in good faith-is the fundamental principle of the law of treaties'. [1966] YBILC, vol II, 211.
2 Cf L Henkin, How Nations Behave (2nd edn Columbia University Press, New York 1979) 47 ('almost all nations observe almost all principles ofinternational law and almost all of their obligations almost all the time').
3
For a list ofICJ cases see <https://www.icj-cij.org/en/pending-cases>. The figures given exclude proceedings
that remain on the Court's docket after a judgment on the merits has been rendered, such as Gabcikovo-Nagymaros
and DRC v Uganda.
4 A Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (3rd edn CUP, Cambridge 2013) 205.
5 Cf Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (adopted 24 April 1963, entered into force 19 March 1967) 596
UNTS 261, Art 36 (VCCR). For details on the 1itigation saga' see eg B Simma and C Hoppe, 'From LaGrand and
Avena to Medellin-A Rocky Road Toward Implementation' (2005) 14 Tulane Jintl Comp L 7.
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obligation to prevent the commission of acts of genocide, as was the case in the proceedings
between Bosnia and Serbia before the ICJ. 6 Finally, at times, conflicting obligations may
even require States to disregard obligations arising under one treaty to comply with the
demands of another-in which case, conflict resolution techniques such as the lex specialis
principle, or jus cogens, may clarify questions of precedence. 7 And, of course, not every
treaty breach is in itself dramatic; the spectrum of what is covered by the term 'treaty breach'
is huge. It comprises acts of aggression amounting to a large-scale violation of Article 2(4)8
of the UN Charter just as it does one State's imposition of an 11 per cent ad valorem import
tax on foreign goods where a treaty binds the tariff to 10.9 per cent.
Against this background, it seems natural that real or alleged treaty breaches are by
no means an exceptional feature of international law, shaped by well over a century of
treatification. The real question is whether international law provides means and methods
to respond to them. This chapter addresses that question. We do so in four steps. First, we
provide an overview of the international regime governing reactions against treaty breaches.
In the next two sections, we analyse the two most relevant generally available means of response under the law of treaties and the law of State responsibility respectively. Our final
section offers some concluding observations. In addressing questions of treaty breaches
and responses, we will focus on rules of international law regulating inter-State behaviour.
Notwithstanding this restriction, it seems clear that treaty breaches can be committed by
and against different (non-State) subjects of international law, notably by and against international organizations. While these raise some special problems (eg relating to determining
whether the organization itself or its members bear responsibility9), they are in principle
subject to the rules developed to govern inter-State relations. 10

I. Specific and General Rules Governing Reactions Against
Treaty Breaches: An Overview
A. Responses 'in [their] infinite variety' 11
Just as treaty breaches are manifold, so are the possible reactions against them. The point
may be illustrated by reverting to the examples of treaty breaches just mentioned and to
6
Case Concerning the Application ofthe Convention on the Prevention and Punishment ofthe Crime ofGenocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Judgment) [2007) ICJ Rep 43.
7
For many details on these-and other-conflicts see the ILC Study Group, 'Fragmentation of International
Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law' (13 April 2006) UN Doc A/
CN.4/L.682.
8
See eg UNGA Res 3314 (XXIX) (14 December 1974), fifth preambular paragraph (describing aggression as
'the most serious and dangerous form of the illegal use of force').
9
For brief comment on this see B Simma and C Tams, 'Article 60 (1986)' in O Corten and P Klein (eds), The
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (OUP, Oxford 2011) volll, [3 )-[ 4].
10
Leaving aside the inclusion of references to 'international organizations: Art 60 of the 1986 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International
Organizations (adopted 21 March 1986, not yet in force) [1986] 25 ILM 543, follows the wording of Art 60 of
the 1969 VCLT (addressed below, in Section II). By the same token, Arts 51-7 of the 2011 Draft Articles on the
Responsibility ofinternational Organizations adapt Arts 49-54 of the Articles on the Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts (addressed below, in Section III) with only minor modifications. See also Chapter 5,
Section III, 107 et seq.
11
Cf R Baxter, 'International Law "In Her Infinite Variety"' (1980) 29 ICLQ 549.
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consider possible responses. State ifs aggression in scenario I could prompt State B-the
victim of the armed attack-to resort to self-defence under Article 51 UN Charter. State C
might want to refer to Article 51 to justify its military support for State B ('collective selfdefence'), while State D might decide to freeze assets to exercise pressure on State A. Other
States are likely to protest against the violation of international law, while the Security
Council could address the matter by imposing sanctions or encouraging enforcement action in defence of State B's territorial integrity.
In scenario 2, the limited violation of tariff bindings by State X is most likely to be addressed bilaterally, through diplomatic channels, perhaps with the assistance of other States,
if State Y (whose exports are affected) does not decide to ignore the matter altogether so as
not to jeopardize its friendly relations with State X. In a variation to scenario 2 (which one
might refer to as scenario 2bis ), violations of tariff bindings that are of a more relevant character might prompt State Y to respond in kind by disregarding its own tariff bindings. If the
matter is governed by World Trade Organization (WTO) law, State Y might institute panel
proceedings under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding. Alongside these more
formal responses, States X and Y, but presumably also other States with some interest in the
matter, might seek a friendly settlement, which might involve consultations, expressions of
concern, incentives, or protests against State X's disregard of international trade rules.

B. Treaty-specific rules and general legal concepts
From this briefest of illustrations, it becomes clear that the range of possible reactions
against treaty breaches is vast. A State's reaction against a treaty breach depends on a variety
of factors, including, inter alia: (i) the character or gravity of the breach; (ii) the relations
between the States involved in the dispute; (ill) the competence ofinternational institutions
to address the matter; and (iv) more particularly, the availability of an independent forum
for dispute resolution. More importantly, the scenarios illustrate that a State's response to
a treaty breach may be governed by two different categories of rules. 12 The first category
comprises what might be termed 'treaty-specific' reactions: a treaty can itself regulate reactions against breaches of its provisions. In scenario 1 above, State B's reliance on self-defence
would be 'treaty-specific: as Article 51 UN Charter permits a specific form of self-help
against a particular breach of the same treaty (namely a qualified use of force against a
breach amounting to an 'armed attack'). By the same token, State C could avail itself of the
treaty-specific possibility of aiding the victim of an armed attack by means of collective
self-defence, just as the Security Council could make use of its treaty-specific enforcement
competence under (and subject to the requirements of) Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In
scenario 2bis, State Y's decision to institute WTO dispute settlement proceedings would
also be 'treaty-specific: as WTO law envisages Panel and Appellate Body proceedings as
suitable modes for resolving disputes about violations of the covered agreements.
However, not all treaties address reactions against breaches, and even those that do need
not be exhaustive in their regulation. Irrespective of any treaty-specific provision, reactions

12 The following distinction draws on C Tams, 'Enforcement' in G Ulfstein and others (eds}, Making Treaties
Work (CUP, Cambridge 2007) 395-6; and further C Tams, 'Regulating Treaty Breaches' in M Bowman and D
Kritsiotis (eds), Conceptual and Contextual Perspectives on the Law ofTreaties (CUP, Cambridge 2018} 440-67.
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against treaty breaches can be based on general legal concepts, which comprise the second
category of rules governing responses to treaty breach. In the scenarios mentioned above,
State D's decision to freeze State N.s assets (unless authorized by the Security Council)
cannot be based on a specific treaty provision and therefore must be justified differently.
Similarly, if State Y decides to respond to State X's violation of tariff bindings by levying
excessive import duties outside the WTO context, it is unlikely that there will be a treatyspecific rule justifying such a tit-for-tat response. More generally, few treaties lay down
express rules governing protests against treaty breaches. The legality of these responses depends then, not on the express terms of the treaty whose breach prompted them, but on
general rules external to the treaty.
The distinction between treaty-specific and general rules governing reactions against
treaty breaches is of considerable importance. While the treaty itself is the obvious locus
for addressing questions of breaches and responses, treaty-specific rules are oflimited relevance for a study focusing on general aspects of treaty law. They are no doubt common
and, taken together, constitute an important element of the international regime governing
responses against treaty breaches. But precisely because of their heterogeneity, they escape
easy classifications. There are but few limits to the creativity of treaty parties in designing
regimes of reactions against treaty breaches, and few models that have not been tried out. In
fact, the two simplified scenarios already mentioned reveal the spectre of approaches, ranging from bilateral consultations to legal or quasi-legal proceedings, but also encompassing
the (potentially massive) use of military force in self-defence. To provide an overview over
treaty-specific rules 'in [their] infinite variety' 13 would be impossible; what is more, it would
be of limited utility as treaty-specific rules are by definition of no general relevance outside
the specific treaty's field of application. For this reason, the subsequent discussion focuses
on responses available under general concepts.

C. Intrinsically lawful responses versus responses
presupposing title to respond
Excluding reactions based on treaty-specific provisions considerably narrows the scope
of inquiry. It may be further restricted on the basis of functional criteria. Notably, a further distinction can be drawn between responses that depend on a title, or justification; and
responses that are permissible as a matter of course. This latter category would comprise
protests, or forms of pressure that are unfriendly, but intrinsically lawful (often described
as retorsions 14). International law does not regulate these responses in any detail-and it
opts against regulation deliberately, as the responses do not reach the threshold of (prima
fade) illegality. Like treaty-based responses, intrinsically lawful reactions can be hugely
relevant: very often, protests-especially by a large group of States-may be an extremely
effective way of resolving a dispute about treaty breaches. On the other hand, they may
sometimes exacerbate tensions and deepen existing frictions.
13

Baxter (n 11) 549.
ILC, 'Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries' [2001]
YBILC, volII, 128 [3] (ASR). For more on retorsion, see eg OY Elagab, The Legality ofNon-Forcible Countermeasures
in International Law (OUP, Oxford 1987} 4, 29-30; KJ Partsch, 'Retorsion' in R Bernhardt (ed), Encyclopaedia of
Public International Law (Amsterdam, Elsevier 2000) vol IV, 232.
14
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By contrast, responses that cross the threshold of (prima fade) illegality require regulation. Of course, international law must permit effective responses against treaty breaches,
but it cannot give carte blanche to responding States. Not surprisingly, it seeks to strike a
balance between the two competing considerations. This balancing exercise has been influenced by changing views of treaty stability and effectiveness within the international community, and is reflected in the general legal regimes permitting coercive responses against
treaty breaches.

D. Treaty law responses versus countermeasures
International law enshrines two main categories of coercive responses ·against treaty
breaches: (i) the suspension or termination of treaties under the law of treaties; and (ii)
the non-performance of obligations justified as a countermeasure under the law of State
responsibility. 15 The first of these is of obvious relevance: given that treaty breaches affect
treaty obligations, one would expect the general law of treaties to address the matter-for
example, by laying down a general provision on potential responses. This general provision is Article 60 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which
puts forward a very nuanced and highly influential regime governing responses to treaty
breaches. As discussed in the next section, it draws fine distinctions based on the impact of
the breach, and on the character of the treaty affected, while also clarifying which obligations are 'sacrosanct' and cannot be suspended or terminated even in cases of breach.
The general law of treaties does not exhaustively regulate responses to treaty breaches.
It might have done so; however, the VCLT as the key text setting out the law of treaties
addresses treaty breaches only in passing. 16 As a consequence, there remains room for
15
In addition to the two main forms discussed herein, commentators remain fascinated by a third concept,
the exceptio inadimpleti contractus. This concept, viewed by some as a general principle oflaw, is said to permit
the non-performance of an obligation in relation to a State that had previously violated its own reciprocal obligation. The exceptio has clearly influenced the principle of reciprocity, which-as we discuss later-informed the
drafting of Art 60 VCLT. However, following the acceptance of Art 60, very little suggests that the exceptio continues to exist as an autonomous defence permitting responses to treaty breaches. Quite to the contrary, as far as
responses based in the law of treaties are concerned, 'Article 60 regulates the legal consequences of treaty breach
in an exhaustive way, thus no version of the exceptio has survived the codification of the law of treaties-may it
rest in peace'. Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (Judgment) [2011) ICJ Rep 695, 708 [29]
(Separate Opinion of Judge Simma); see also ibid [4]-[29] for a fuller discussion. It is worth noting that, in the case
to which this separate opinion was appended, the majority of the Court showed a curious 'Beriihrungsangst' (ibid
[6] (Separate Opinion of Judge Simma); it chose not to rule out that there could be some room for the exceptio,
without however indicating how it could apply. See Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (2011]
ICJ Rep 644, 690-91 [161). For a comprehensive account of the earlier debate, see BSimma, 'Reflections on Article
60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and Its Background in General International Law' (1970)
20 OZOR 19-23, 52-5 ('Simma, Reflections'); for attempts to carve out a niche for the exceptio, see J Crawford,
'Third Report on State Responsibility' (2000) UN Doc A/CN.4/507/ Add.2, [324)-(325); R Provost, 'Reciprocity in
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law' (1994) 65 BYBIL 398-400; and most recently, M Xiouri, 'The Exceptio Non
Adimpleti Contractus in Public International Law' (2019) 21 lnt'l Comm L Rev 56-92.
16
See S Rosenne, Breach of Treaty (Grotius, Cambridge 1985) 3-8. Rosenne rightly notes that the VCLT approach deliberately distinguishes the 'law of treaties' from the 'law of obligations' imposed by treaties. Ibid 4. This
distinction, he observed, 'made it necessary to find another basis for the systematic classification and treatment of
the law of international obligations as such ... This was found in a thorough reconstruction of the nature, scope
and treatment of the law of State responsibility'. Ibid. The ICJ has emphasized this as well. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros
Project (Hungary v Slovakia) (Judgment) [1997) ICJ Rep 7, 38 [47) (the VCLT 'confines itself to defining-in a
limitative manner-the conditions in which a treaty may lawfully be denounced or suspended; while the effects
of a denunciation or suspension seen as not meeting those conditions are, on the contrary, expressly excluded
from the scope of the Convention by operation of Article 73. It is moreover well established that, when a State has
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responses based, not on the general law of treaties, but on the law of State responsibility,
which is detailed in the 2001 Articles on State Responsibility (ASR). In State responsibility 'jargon, a treaty breach amounts to an internationally wrongful act, and entails the
ensuing duties of cessation (where applicable) and reparation.17 More importantly, the
general rules of responsibility also contain provisions governing the invocation of responsibility and inducing the wrongdoer to return to legality by way of countermeasures. 18
Countermeasures can in fact be taken against all forms of wrongful acts, but it is clear that
they are also available against treaty breaches. They permit 'the non-performance for the
time being of international obligations of the State taking the measures towards the responsible State' 19 (having violated a treaty). And they are subject to a number of conditions and
exclusionary clauses.
On the face of it, countermeasures and treaty law responses may seem similar. Subject to
certain conditions, both are available against a treaty breach. Both concepts allow for reactions that take the form of suspension of treaty benefits. And, of course, States invoking the
two concepts must establish an entitlement to do so-they must be affected by the previous
breach against which their response is directed. Yet, notwithstanding these commonalities, international law draws a fine, conceptual distinction between countermeasures,
on the one hand, and treaty law responses on the other. 20 It does so, moreover, for good
reasons. Despite their similarities, the two types of responses serve different purposes.
Countermeasures aim to compel the defaulting State to cease its violation of international
law and/or restore the situation that would have existed had there been no such violation.21 In contrast, treaty law responses aim to remedy a situation in which the balance
of rights and obligations within a treaty relationship has been upset due to a prior breach
by the defaulting State.22 At least in theory, treaty law responses must be restricted to synallagmatic pairs of obligations. In contrast, a party resorting to countermeasures may
choose-subject to a number of specific exceptions-which obligation it intends to violate. In addition, both forms of reaction may be distinguished by their effect on the norm
in question. A countermeasure constitutes the (justified) violation of a binding norm; it
has no effect on the continued existence of the norm as such. In contrast, reactions under
Article 60 VCLT involve the temporary or permanent extinction of a norm; that is, theyat least temporarily-remove the underlying legal bond between the disputing parties.23
committed an internationally wrongful act, its international responsibility is likely to be involved whatever the nature of the obligation it has failed to respect'); Art 73 VCLT (VCLT is 'without prejudice' to questions arising from
a treaty on 'the international responsibility of a State').
17

ASR (n 14) Arts 2, 30, and 31.
Ibid Arts 22, 49-54.
Ibid Art 49(1).
2
For further details on this point, see B Simma and C Tams, 'Article 60 (1969)' in O Corten and P Klein (eds),
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (OUP, Oxford 2011) vol II, [4], [69]-[73]. The proceedings in the Interim Accord case before the ICJ would seem to confirm the conceptual distinction set out in the
text: both the parties and the Court treated treaty-based and responsibility-based responses separately. See Interim
Accord case (n 15) [118]-[122] and [161]-[165].
21
See Art 49( l) ASR (countermeasures are taken 'in order to induce that State to comply with its obligations');
for commentary; see ibid 129-30 [7].
22
F Capotorti, '!:extinction et la suspension des traites' (1971-III) 134 RdC 417, 548-9; Simma, Reflections
18
19

°

(n 15) 20-1.
23

Cf Crawford (n 15) [324]-[325] (referencing the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Case (n 16) 39 [48]). See also Provost

(n 15) 398-9.
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This difference is reflected in the different legal regimes governing countermeasures and
treaty law responses, which the next sections spell out.

II. The Law of Treaties: Article 60 VCLT
The regime set out in Article 60 constitutes an ambitious attempt to categorize the system
of treaty-based responses against violations of international agreements. Within the framework of the general law of treaties, it aims at balancing two competing considerations,
namely the need for effective responses against treaty breaches and the overarching interest
in preserving treaty commitments. This balancing exercise has resulted in a very complex
and perhaps overambitious regime. It is characterized by four features: (a) the decision to
make treaty-based responses dependent on a qualified ('material') breach; (b) an attempt to
restrict the scope of the right to suspend or terminate treaties; (c) the development ofa complex categorization of treaties with a view to identifying States entitled to respond against
breaches; and (d) the submission of the right to suspend or terminate treaties to cumbersome procedural preconditions.

A. The requirement of a material breach
Pursuantto the opening phrases of Article 60( I) and (2) VCLT, suspension and termination
of treaties can only be sought in response to breaches of a material character. 24 With a view
to ensuring the stability of treaty relations, drafters thus chose not to codify any remedies
against immaterial breaches, 25 an approach followed for both termination and mere suspension of treaties. 26 Article 60(3) 'defines' a material breach by distinguishing two cases.
The first of these is an obvious one: pursuant to Article 60(3)(a), the repudiation of a treaty
(ie any attempt by a State to relieve itself from its obligations27 ) will generally28 constitute a
material breach. While practice applying paragraph 3(a) is sparse, 29 the Namibia case and

24 Cf [1966) YBILC, vol II, 255 [7). The term 'material breacli was adopted in 1963 upon the proposal of the
ILC's Special Rapporteur, Sir Humphrey Waldock; it substituted the term 'fundamental breacli suggested by the
previous Special Rapporteur, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice. See H Waldock, 'Second Report on the Law of Treaties'
[1963 I YBILC, vol II, 75 [11) ('Waldock, Second Report'); GG Fitzmaurice, 'Second Report on the Law of Treaties'
[1957) YBILC, vol II, 31 (draft Art 19(2)) ('Fitzmaurice, Second Report'); and the clear account in T Giegerich,
'Article 60' in O Dorr and K Schmalenbach (eds), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (2nd
edn Springer, Berlin 2018), [19)-(23).
25
This raises the question whether reactions against immaterial breaches are permitted under general international law; see Section III, 585-92 et seq.
26 In contrast, Fitzmaurice had drawn a distinction between suspension and termination. In his view, at least
partial suspension would have been justified in response to breaches of a lesser character, cf Fitzmaurice, Second
Report (n 24) 30 (draft Art 18); GG Fitzmaurice, 'Fourth Report on the Law ofTreaties' (1957) YBILC, vol II, 50
(draft Art 37) ('Fitzmaurice, Fourth Report').
27 See UN Conference on the Law of Treaties, Summary Records of Second Session (9 April-22 May 1969) UN
Doc A/CONF.39/11/Add.l, 115 [73) ('Vienna Conference, Second Session'); P Reuter, Introduction au droit des
traites (PUP, Paris 1995) 182 (note to (301)). During the Vienna Conference, various delegations submitted alternative proposals substituting the term 'repudiation', see M Gomaa, Suspension or Termination of Treaties on
Grounds ofBreach (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden 1996) 26 n4.
28 This does not comprise repudiations 'sanctioned by the present Conventiorr, ie cases in which a State is entitled not to perform a treaty pursuant to Arts 46-64 VCLT; see Giegerich (n 24) [25).
29 See Gomaa (n 27) 15 I. The provision was unsuccessfully raised in some cases before municipal courts, see eg
Australian Federal Court, Hempel and Another v Attorney-Genera/ (Judgment) (1987) 87 ILR 159, 163.
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the more recent Slovenia-Croatia case provide illustrations. In Namibia, the ICJ held that by
disregarding obligations deriving from a 1922 agreement, South Africa had 'disavowed' the
mandate, 30 which the majority considered to amount to a repudiation. 31 In the more recent
arbitration between Slovenia and Croatia, the Arbitral Tribunal clarified that 'repudiation'
meant the 'rejection of a treaty as a whole'. 32 It then found that irregular contacts between
the agent of a party and a party-appointed arbitrator in 'blatant violation' of the arbitration agreement did not amount to a repudiation if the defaulting party 'recognised its continuing obligations under the ... agreement: 33
The more relevant aspect of the material breach 'definition' is given in Article 60(3 )(b ),
which qualifies as material any 'violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment
of the object or purpose of the treaty'. In so doing, it adopts an understanding of 'material
breach' that may at first seem counterintuitive. Contrary to what might be expected, there
is no reference to the intensity or gravity of the breach; instead, the provision's focus is on
the character of the treaty obligation that is being breached. 1his notably means that Article
60 does not permit responses against grave breaches of treaty provisions that are not essential. 34 Conversely, but more controversially, the textual analysis suggest that trivial breaches
of essential provisions can constitute material breaches under Article 60(3)(b). Whether
this is indeed a desirable approach may be open to debate, 35 especially since earlier draft
provisions had required a substantial violation. 36 The clear wording of Article 60(3)(b),
however, admits oflittle doubt in this respect. 37
Neither the text of the provision nor the International Law Commission's (ILC's) commentary clarify what is meant by an 'essential provision. It is clear from the wording that
the determination has to be made in light of, and with reference to, the treaty's object and
purpose. 38 The term 'essential' suggests that the provision in question must have been at the
heart of a treaty. 39 However, from the travaux, it appears that the ILC did not intend this to
be overly restrictive; hence it considered that provisions of an ancillary character could be

30
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South-West Africa)
(Advisory Opinion) (1971] ICJ Rep 16, 47 (95].
31
Ibid; see also ibid 218 (Separate Opinion of Judge de Castro). It must be noted, however, that the Court did
not clearly distinguish between cases of 'repudiation' (Art 60(3)(a)) and 'violations of essential provisions' (Art
60(3}(b)). In an Annex to his dissenting opinion, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice criticized the majority's approach; in his
view, South Africa had denied the obligation's existence, which was not the same as to repudiate it. Ibid Annex I6].
32
Arbitration between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic ofSlovenia, Partial Award (30 June 2016) PCA
Case No 2012-04, (213]. (The first-named author was a member of the Arbitral Tribunal in this case.)
33
Ibid (208] and (214].
34
The drafting history is very clear on this point. At the Vienna Conference, delegates rejected a Finnish proposal pursuant to which grave breaches of treaties should generally give rise to a right to suspend performance or
terminate the treaty, irrespective ofthe essential (or otherwise) character of the provision affected. UN Conference
on the Law of Treaties, Official Records: Documents of the Conference (1968-1969) UN Doc A/CONR39/14/
Add.2, 181 (522] ('Vienna Conference, Official Records').
35
DW Greig, 'Reciprocity, Proportionality, and the Law of Treaties' (1994) 34 VJIL 295, 342-3; P Malanczuk,
Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law (7th edn Routledge, London 1997) 143.
36
See Waldock, Second Report (n 24) draft Art 20 (providing that '(a] material breach of a treaty results
from ... a breach so substantial as to be tantamount to setting aside any provisions ... the failure to perform which
is not compatible with the effective fulfilment of the object and purpose of the treaty'); [1966] YBILC, vol II, 255
I6]; F Kirgis, 'Some Lingering Questions About Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties' (I 989)
22 Cornell Int LJ 554.
37
See Gomaa (n 27) 33.
38
As the ILC made clear in its commentary, this primarily requires an analysis of the reasons that led to the conclusion of the treaty. [1966] YBILC, vol II, 255 [9]. By way of illustration, cf Military and Paramilitary Activities in
and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States ofAmerica) (Judgment) (1986] ICJ Rep 14, 137 (273].
39
Gomaa (n 27) 31.
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essential.40 This statement (which may surprise at first sight) has to be seen in the context
of debates about dispute settlement clauses. These clauses are typically not a treaty's one
and only central aspect, and yet, the drafters were keen to clarify that their violation could
amount to a 'material breadi. 41
Given the absence of clear normative guidance, it is no surprise that courts and tribunals
charged with applying Article 60 have not come up with comprehensive definitions. Some
judgments in fact merely restate the necessity of distinguishing between 'normal' and 'material' treaty violations. 42 Statements made in proceedings before Austrian courts would
seem to confirm that provisions may acquire an 'essential' status over time if the normative
framework of the treaty changes. 43 From the ICJ's approach in the Nicaragua case, it may
be inferred that flagrant violations of generally formulated treaty obligations are likely to
be seen as 'material breaches' in the sense of Article 60(3)(b). There, the Court considered
the mining of Nicaraguan ports and direct attacks on ports and oil installations to be material breaches of the bilateral Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) Treaty, while
US import restrictions on Nicaraguan sugar and its efforts to prevent international organizations from granting loans to Nicaragua were held not to be 'material'.44 Finally, in the
more recent arbitration between Croatia and Slovenia, the Arbitral Tribunal emphasized
that where the parties (or one of them) had taken action in response to a breach, it was necessary to determine in light of this 'remedial action' whether the object and purpose of a
treaty could still be attained. 45
Of course, these attempts to make sense of the concept of'material breach' remain closely
tied to the facts of each case, some of which were very particular. Generally, international
practice and jurisprudence still seem to grapple with applying the curious 'definition' in
Article 60(3) to specific instances.

B. The scope of the right
Article 60 not only elaborates upon conditions restricting the suspension/termination
of a treaty; it also regulates the scope of that right. It does so, however, in a rather rudimentary, and not always compelling, way. To some extent, the regulation had to remain fragmentary, as material breaches, depending on the circumstances, may produce
very different effects. Some undermine the treaty as a whole, others affect only some
of its aspects-and responding States will tailor their responses accordingly. Even so,
40 [1966] YBILC, vol II, 255 [9]; see also Waldock, Second Report (n 24) 75 [l l]. In order to broaden the scope
of the provision, the ILC replaced Fitzmaurice's term 'fundamental breach' with the notion of a 'material breach'.
For Fitzmaurice's use of terminology, cf Fitzmaurice, Second Report (n 24) 31 (draft Art 19(2) ).
41
See Waldock, Second Report (n 24) 75 [ll]; for a different interpretation of Art 60(3)(b), see the statement of
the Uruguyan delegate Jimenez de Arechaga. UN Conference on the Law of Treaties, Summary Records of the First
Session (26 March-24 May 1968) UN Doc A/CONF.39/11, 356 [39] ('Vienna Conference, First Session'). Apart
from the example of dispute settlement clauses, no other examples of such 'essential ancillary' character are given.
42
See eg Malachtou v Annefti and Armefti (Judgment of the Cyprus Supreme Court of 20 January 1987) 88 ILR
199,210.
43
See the position taken by the Austrian government in a Swiss-Austrian dispute relating to the right to acquire real property under a Treaty ofEstablishment of 1875, noted by P Fischer and G Hafner, 'Austrian Practice in
International Law' (1976) 26 OZOR 301, 345-6. The case is discussed in B Simma, 'Termination and Suspension of
Treaties. Two Recent Austrian Cases' (1978) 21 German Ybk Intl L 74.
44 Nicaragua case (n 38) 138 (275)-(276].
45 Croatia Slovenia case (n 32) (219]-[225].
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Article 60 presents a curious mix of strict limitations and non-regulation. Three features
standout.
First, contrary to what might be suggested by its title-'Termination or suspension of the
operation of a treaty .. :-Article 60 deliberately limits the right of termination. Both Article
60(1) (dealing with material breach and bilateral treaties) and 60(2)(a) (dealing with collective responses to material breach) are addressed later, and both deal with suspension and
termination. But States' individual responses under Article 60(2)(b) and 2(c) (dealing with
multilateral treaty breach in the absence of unanimity) are restricted to the suspension of an
agreement. The exclusion of termination in these latter two provisions reflects the drafters'
opinion that in the case of multilateral treaties, the interest of third parties in the stability of
treaty relations had to be taken into account.46
Second, compared to responsibility-based responses (addressed in Section III), Article
60 severely limits the discretion of States in choosing how to respond to material breaches.
Article 60( 1) and (2) make it clear that the responding party may only suspend or terminate
the same treaty breached by the defaulting State. Article 60 does not justify the suspension
or termination of other treaties. This reflects the purpose of treaty-based responses, which
are designed to re-establish the balance of rights between treaty parties, and as a matter of
principle, seems uncontroversial. One might query, however, whether the principle should
have been qualified. Notably, the ILC discussed whether (exceptionally) responding States
could suspend or terminate another treaty, if it was closely linked to the one materially
breached. 47 This indeed would have been preferable, especially for formally distinct treaties
that could only be agreed by way of a 'package deal: 48 The ILC's decision not to include any
provision on interrelated treaties however answered this question in the negative. 49
Third, and in contrast, within the framework of the same treaty, responding parties enjoy
a wide measure of discretion to choose which parts they wish to suspend, terminate, or leave
intact. In particular, they may decide whether to suspend or terminate a treaty in whole
or in part.so As Article 44(2) makes clear, this freedom is not affected by the VCLT rules
on separability, which, in view of the drafters, would have imposed too big a restraint.SI
Perhaps more surprisingly, Article 60 does not require responses to be proportionate. This
was deliberate insofar as the drafters decided against including a requirement of 'qualitative
46
See [1966] YBILC, vol II, 255 [7J. For multilateral treaties that are bilateral in application (the subject of Art
60(2)(a)), this approach seems misleading; any response to their violation, whether termination or suspension,
would only affect the two parties to the dispute. The complete exclusion of termination thus seems unwarranted
here. Simma, Reflections (n 15) 67-8; Gomaa (n 27) 104.
47
[1963) YBILC, vol I, 121 [79] (De Luna); cf also A Verdross and B Simma, Universelles Viilkerrecht (3rd edn
Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1984) 520 n42; E Schwelb, 'Termination or Suspension of the Operation of a 'Ireaty as
a Consequence ofits Breach' (1967) 7 IJIL 316-17; A McNair, The Law of Treaties (Clarendon, Oxford 1961) 571;
Simma, Reflections (n 15) 22; M Virally, 'Le principe de la reciprocite en droit international contemporain' (1967III) 122 RdC l, 44-5.
48
By way of example, one might think of the German-Polish negotiations of October 1975, which led to the
conclusion of two distinct, but interrelated treaties; the first obliging Germany to grant Poland a credit, the other
obliging Poland to modify its hitherto restrictive rules on the freedom of movement. For references see Verdross
and Simma (n 47) 520 n42.
49
Cf G Arangio-Ruiz, 'Third Report on State Responsibility' [1991] YBILC, vol II, 23 [72).
so This applies to all responses under Art 60, even though the wording of Art 60(2)(a) remains misleading. For
details see the debates at the Vienna Conference, First Session (n 41) 167 [30], 168 [32].
51
As pointed out by Waldock (Expert Consultant), the rules laid down in Art 44 (then draft Art 41) could in
some situations have even prevented responding parties from suspending the very provision that had been violated by the defaulting party, cf Vienna Conference, First Session (n 41) 237 [40]. See further Waldock's explanation for draft Art 26 of the 1963 draft. Waldock, Second Report (n24) 90 [l). The Vienna debates (which, at least
initially, were controversial) are reproduced in Vienna Conference, First Session (n 41) 229-34.
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proportionality',52 that is, a duty of responding parties to limit their reactions to the very obligations that had been materially breached, or that were connected to them in some way. 53
It is another question whether responding States have to observe the limits of quantitative
proportionality, that is, restrict themselves to responses of similar intensity. 54 The question
may arise in particular where a State seeks to respond against trivial violations of essential provisions. 55 In this case, the text of Article 60 does not seem to limit the intensity of
reactions-once there has been a material breach, the responding State is free to suspend
(or indeed terminate) the treaty in whole or in part. The better view would presumably be
to 'read' proportionality into the text of the provision, in the way this is being suggested
for other responses to qualified violations of international law. 56 There is considerable evidence that proportionality constitutes an overriding principle generally governing reactions
against breaches of international law. 57 However, the matter is far from settled, and the text
itself does not support this more restrictive approach. 58
Finally, the rightto suspend or terminate a treaty is restricted by the exclusionary clause of
Article 60(5) VCLT, which declares certain treaty provisions to be sacrosanct.59 Under this
provision, States may not suspend or terminate 'provisions relating to the protection of the
human person contained in treaties of a humanitarian character, in particular to provisions
prohibiting any form of reprisals against persons'. The purpose of the clause is to protect the
beneficiaries of humanitarian treaties from losing their rights in the course of inter-State
disputes. 60 The drafting history suggests that despite the curious wording, this exclusion is
intended to cover provisions of international humanitarian law and international human
rights law. 61 The ICJ, in the Namibia opinion, seemed to consider Article 60(5) to reflect
general international law. 62 However, upon consideration, its relevance-at least within
52

CfSimma, Reflections (n 15) 21-2, 78; Arangio-Ruiz (n 49) 24 [77].
Notably, during the Vienna Conference, delegates rejected a US amendment that would have limited reactions to responses in kind: see Vienna Conference, Official Records (n 34) 181 [522]; Vienna Conference, First
Session (n 41) 389.
54 On quantitative proportionality, see ASR (n 14) Art 51, pursuant to which '[c]ountermeasures must be commensurate with the injury suffered, taking into account the gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the
rights in questioO: a topic discussed at nn 112-l 9 and accompanying text.
55 See nn 24-45 and accompanying text, for comment on the curious way Art 60 seeks to define 'material breach'.
Where a trivial breach of an essential provision qualifies as a material breach, it could not be said that proportionality was 'pre-built into the mechanism' of Art 60. Cf Gomaa (n 27) 120.
56
By way of illustration, see the ICJ's advisory opinion in Nuclear Weapons, reading proportionality (and necessity) into the rules governing self-defence: 'The submission of the exercise of the right of self-defence to the
conditions of necessity and proportionality is a rule of customary international law: Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226, 245 [41].
57 In the words ofWillem Riphagen, 'a "rule of [quantitative] proportionality'' would seem to govern in principle
all ... legal consequences [of an internationally wrongful act]'. !LC, 'Preliminary Report on State Responsibility'
[1980] YBILC, vol II, 112 [27]; see also Verdross and Simma (n 47) 520 [816].
58
Contrast, for example, the parties' different approaches in the ICAO Council case. In the view of India, reactions under Art 60 did not have to be proportionate. Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council (India
v Pakistan) [1972] ICJ Pleadings 422 [52] (Reply by India). Predictably, Pakistan took the opposite approach. Ibid
384 [38] (Counter-Memorial of Pakistan).
59
On the drafting history of the provision, see E Schwelb, 'The Law of Treaties and Human Rights' (1973-1975)
16 Archiv des V<ilkerrechts l, 14-26. In addition, it is worth reiterating that (in line with the lex specialis maxim),
Art60 is 'without prejudice' to special (treaty-specific) rules agreed in particular agreements. See Section I.B 570-71
et seq.; and the discussion in the Croatia Slovenia case (n 32) [203]-[206].
6
For the drafting process, see Vienna Conference, First Session (n 41) 354 [12]; Vienna Conference, Second
Session (n 27) 112 [20]; Vienna Conference, Official Records (n 34) 269 (quoting UN Doc A/CONF.39/L31).
61
See Vienna Conference, First Session (n 41) 354 [12] (Bindschedler) and further G Barile, 'The Protection of
Human Rights in Article 60, Paragraph 5 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties' in International Law at
the Time of its Codification. Essays in Honour ofRoberto Ago (Giuffre, Milan 1987) vol II, 3-14.
62 Namibia case (n 30) 47 [95].
53
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human rights law proper-is more limited than is usually assumed. 1his is so because very
often (as will be discussed in the next section), material breaches of human rights treaties do
not affect any other treaty party in a particular way. Hence, often no other State has standing
to suspend or terminate human rights treaties. Article 60(5), of course, clarifies this and
thus removes legal uncertainty; however, even without its inclusion, human rights provisions would have effectively been protected against suspension and termination. 63
Interestingly, Article 60(5) is the only exclusionary clause expressly restricting the right to
suspend or terminate treaties. While seeking to declare human rights provisions sacrosanct,
the drafters did not include a more comprehensive exclusionary clause. Since the adoption
of Article 60, it has occasionally been discussed whether States should be precluded from
suspending or terminating treaty provisions that enshrine provisions of a peremptory nature.64 Such an approach would indeed seem implicit in the rationale underlyingjus cogens
norms, as norms 'from which no derogation is permitted'. 65 However, Article 60 fails to take
up the matter, and given the paucity of practice, it is no surprise that uncertainties remain.

C. Standing to suspend or terminate treaties
As the suspension or termination of a treaty affects its international obligations, a State
invoking Article 60 must be legally entitled to do so. In this respect, two aspects need to
be distinguished. First, any response finds its ultimate justification in the prior breach by
the other State party. However, that in itself is not enough: in addition, the responding
State must, second, have been affected by that prior breach. It must have 'standing' to react.
Standing is addressed in Article 60(1) and (2), which distinguish between bilateral and
multilateral treaties and collective and individual responses. The result is a very complex
regime of 'standing to respond against treaty breaches'. This regime is not beyond criticism,
but it has had a lasting influence on our understanding of the character of multilateral obligations more generally and in a modified way reappears in the relevant provisions addressing standing to invoke State responsibility.
That the regime of standing is so complex is due to the rise of multilateral treaty obligations. Within the framework of a multilateral treaty, it may be extremely difficult to
assess which of the parties should be entitled to respond against another party's material
breach. Of course, some treaties say so expressly (eg by recognizing a right of each and
every State party to respond against breaches66 ) and within regimes providing for regular
recourse to third-party dispute resolution, some courts or tribunals have clarified the requirement of locus standi. 67 But in the absence of such treaty-specific approaches, the
63

The point is covered below, in Section 11.C, and further explored in Sirnma and Tams (n 20) [45].
See eg ibid [49]-[51].
Art 53 VCLT.
66
See eg European Convention on Human Rights (adopted 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September
1953) ETS 5, Art 33 (ECHR); American Convention on Human Rights (adopted 22 November 1969, entered into
force 18 July 1978) 1144 UNTS 123, Art 45; African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (adopted 27 June 1981,
entered into force 21 October 1986) [1982] 21 ILM 58, Art 47; Constitution of the International Labour Organization
(adopted 9 October 1946, entered into force 20 April 1948) 15 UNTS 35, Art 26; Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU), Art 259 (formerly Art 227 ofthe Treaty establishing the European Community).
67
See eg the jurisprudence of WTO Panels and the Appellate Body on questions of standing to bring WTO
complaints: WTO, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas
('Bananas Ilf)-Report of the Panel (22 May 1997) WT/DS27/R [7.46]-[7.51], and Bananas III-Appellate Body
64
65
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general rules governing standing to raise breaches of multilateral obligations are by no
means easy to assess.
At the outset, it is worth noting that bilateral treaties present few problems. Where one
State violates a bilateral treaty in a material way, the other party obviously has standing
to respond to that breach. Subject to the exclusions mentioned in Article 60{5) VCLT, a
treaty party can thus suspend or terminate each and every bilateral treaty breached by the
other side.
With respect to multilateral treaties, matters are more complex.68 During the travaux,
and ever since, the key question has been whether the position of States parties to multilateral treaties should be assimilated to that of States under bilateral treaties, that is, within a
clearly defined reciprocal legal relationship. On this, the ILC's debates reveal considerable
uncertainty.69 Drafters on the one hand acknowledged that all parties had an interest in the
treaty's observance. On the other hand, they accepted that not all multilateral treaties could
be treated alike and that material violations would not always affect all parties in the same
way. The ILC initially favoured the first of these approaches and stressed the solidarity of all
parties within a multilateral treaty framework: according to draft Article 42(2)(a), adopted
in 1963, 'any other party' could respond to breaches of multilateral treaties by way of suspension. 70 This was refreshingly simple, but critically received by governments 71 and in the
literature72-especially since the 'solidarity view' neglected that a material breach might
affect different parties very differently, and seemed to place insufficient emphasis on the stability of treaty relations. 73 Taking up these concerns, the eventual standing regime moved
away from the 'solidarity approach: In so doing, the drafters managed to ensure (more)
treaty stability, but had to embrace complexity. The regime eventually put forward in Article
60(2) is best understood in terms of one restrictive rule and two more liberal exceptions.
1. The restrictive rule
The restrictive rule is found in Article 60(2)(b), pursuant to which 'specially affected' States
are entitled to suspend (but not terminate) treaties. The attribute 'specially affected' is not
defined, but it clearly was introduced to indicate the move away from the solidarity approach just outlined. In order to be specially affected, a party to a treaty must have been
individually injured by the material breach in question; the general interest in seeing the
Report (9 September 1997) WT/DS27/AB/R [131]-(136], respectively. For comment see J Waincymer, WTO
Litigation: Procedural Aspects ofFormal Dispute Settlement (Cameron, London 2002) 154-7.
68 It is worth noting that notwithstanding the heterogeneity of multilateral treaties (which under the VCLT
scheme cover narrow tripartite agreements just as much as universal lawmaking agreements), the drafters of the
VCLT put forward one rule for all of them.
69
For further details, see Simma and Tams (n 20) (26]-( 40].
70 [1963] YBILC, vol II, 204. This was based on Waldock's draft (Waldock, Second Report (n 24) 72 (Art 20(4)(a))),
which however went further in accepting a right of'any other party' to suspend or terminate the treaty in relation
to the defaulting State. Within the ILC, Waldock's attempt to broaden the circle of parties entitled to respond to
material breaches of multilateral treaties was endorsed inter alia by Rosenne (who later changed his view on the
matter), Castren, and Briggs. See [1966] YBILC, vol I(l), 60 (26], 61 (40], [47]. Toe opposite view was taken by
Verdross, (1963] YBILC, vol I, 294 (62]; and, in 1966, by Cadieux, de Luna, and Rosenne, [1966] YBILC, vol I(l),
62 (60], 63 [70], and 128 [7].
71
See eg [1966] YBILC, volII, Annex, 381 § 17 (the Netherlands); and cf Simma, Reflections (n 15) 69-70.
72
See eg Schwelb (n 47) 321-6; H Rolin, 'Statement' (1967) 52 Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit International,
vol II, 359-61.
73
One recurring point of concern was that draft Art 42(2)(a) would have permitted non-compliance with
standard-setting conventions protecting collective interests. CfSchwelb (n 47) 321-6; Rolin (n 72) 359-61.
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terms of the treaty observed (which is shared by 'any party to the treaty') is not sufficient.74
In practice, such 'special effects' are accepted in mainly two scenarios.
First, one State may have a particular interest in seeing a multilateral obligation performed. This is notably the case for multilateral obligations that-despite binding a plurality of States-are performed in a strictly bilateral context. 75 Like under bilateral treaties,
these obligations are based on synallagmatic relations, giving rise to reciprocal rights and
duties between pairs of States. Duties under multilateral diplomatic or consular agreements
provide a classic example: while the treaties in question are multilateral, obligations arising
under them are to be performed between pairs of receiving and sending States. The same
would seem to apply to obligations arising under multilateral treaties on judicial assistance,
the exchange of trade benefits, or conventions in the field of humanitarian law. In all these
cases, the 'litmus test' is whether the multilateral treaty's application takes place between
pairs of States and in what has been described as a 'quasi-bilateral' setting. If this is the case,
a material breach of the multilateral treaty will 'specially affect' the other State party to the
quasi-bilateral setting-the sending or receiving State; the State having requested judicial
assistance; the State party to an armed conflict; or, the State profiting directly from an exchange of benefits.
Second, even where the obligation is to be performed outside quasi-bilateral settings, the
effect of the material breach may still 'specially affect' one State.76 It may occur, for example,
where a State violates treaty-based rights of foreign nationals (which would specially affect
the State of nationality); where one State's material breach of an environmental obligation
produces particularly grave effects on the territory of another State ( such as the coastal State
suffering from an oil spill); or, arguably, where one State party has a special responsibility
to guarantee a treaty status (such as a special right to protect nationals of another State belonging to a distinct ethnic group). 77 Of course, these examples merely illustrate the general
approach, and there is no hard and fast rule comprehensively defining instances of special
effects based on special consequences. Thus, Article 60(2)(b), on the one hand, sets out a
flexible requirement of 'special effects: but on the other hand, in requiring some form of
special effect in the first place, requires States seeking to respond against a treaty breach to
establish some form of individual injury. This marks a significant modification of the ILC's
initial approach, and restricts the circle of States entitled to respond to material breaches
under Article 60(2)(b).

2. Two liberal exceptions
There are two limited settings where this rather restrictive approach limiting standing
to respond against material breaches is given up. The first of these exceptions is found
in Article 60(2)(a), which addresses collective responses. As is clear from the text, when
acting collectively, all other parties enjoy wide freedom to react against material breaches
of multilateral treaties. They can suspend the treaty in whole or in part or terminate it
74

See DN Hutchinson, 'Solidarity and Breaches of Multilateral Treaties' (1988) 59 BYBIL 188-9; Schwelb

(n 47) 324.
75

See Simma and Tams (n 20) 1362 et seq.
Cf Provost (n 15) 40 l; Schwelb (n 47) 324.
77
Schwelb (n 47) 324. See, for example, Annex IV and Art 10(2) of the 1946 Peace Treaty with Italy-providing
for a right of protection of the Austrian government with respect to German-speaking inhabitants of South
Tyrol-and the decision by the European Commission on Human Rights in Austria v Italy (App 788/60) (1961) 4
Yearbook 116,142 (EComHR).
76

582

AVOIDING OR EXITING TREATY COMMITMENTS

either in the relations between themselves and the defaulting State, or as between all the
parties. In other words, they may choose between finally or temporarily expelling the violator from the treaty, or bringing the whole treaty relationship to an end. In order to do
so, however, they have to act unanimously. This may be a realistic option in treaties with
a limited number of parties, but it is increasingly difficult in universal multilateral treaty
regimes with wide membership. It does not come as a surprise, then, that Article 60(2)(a)
has been of limited practical relevance. In its 1971 advisory opinion on Namibia, the
ICJ seemed to interpret the termination of the mandate for South West Africa as an exercise of the Article 60(2)(a) right. 78 Perhaps the suspension of Egypt's membership in
the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), in 1979, could be seen as another instance on point (provided one is willing to accept that Egypt's entering into peace agreements with Israel could amount to a material breach of the OIC Charter).79 Yet these are
isolated-and dubious-incidents.
1he second exception is found in Article 60(2)(c). It, too, has limited practical relevance, but is conceptually important. Article 60(2)(c) recognizes that, for a small circle
of obligations, each party to a treaty can respond to material breaches individually, irrespective of any special injury, thus accepting the premise of the 'solidarity approach:
It does so, however, only with respect to a very narrowly formulated category of obligations, namely so-called 'integral' obligations.80 These are described, in rather complicated
terms, as obligations 'a material breach of [which] by one party radically changes the position of every party with respect to the further performance of its obligations: The provision refers back to a category of treaties, initially described by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice,81
that operate on the basis of 'global reciprocity'. 82 The objective of such treaties can only
be achieved through the interdependent performance of obligations by all parties.83
Examples discussed by the drafters include disarmament treaties or treaties prohibiting
the use of particular weapons; to these, treaties prohibiting the acquisition of territory
by force may be added. 84 In order to be meaningful, the VCLT drafters assumed, these
treaties would have to be performed by every party vis-a-vis every other party. Conversely,
one party's non-compliance would affect all other parties to the treaty. On the basis of this
understanding, Article 60(2)(c) recognizes the right of each and every other party to respond to material breaches. What is more, because of the obligations' interdependent (or
78 Cf Namibia case (n 30) 47 [94]. This interpretation would be problematic because the UNG& resolution was
not unanimous, but adopted by 114 votes to two with three abstentions. As evident from the wording of the provision, Art 60(2)(a), however, requires unanimity.
79
See OIC Charter, 914 UNTS 103, and OIC Resolution 18/10-P of 12 May 1979. The case is discussed in KD
Magliveras, The Exclusion from Participation in International Organisations (Brill, Leiden 1999) 237-8.
8 For brief comments, see M Fitzmaurice and O Elias, Contemporary Issues in the Law of Treaties (Eleven
International Publishing, Utrecht 2005) 158-64; LA Sicilianos, 'The Classification of Obligations and the
Multilateral Dimension of the Relations oflnternational Responsibility' (2002) 13 EJIL 1127.
81 Fitzmaurice, Second Report (n 24) 31, 54 [126] (draft Art 19(1)(ii)(b) and (iii) and commentary); GG
Fitzmaurice, 'Third Report on the Law of Treaties' [1958] YBILC, vol II, 27-8, 41 [78] and 44 [91]-[93) (draft Art
18(2), 19(a) and commentary), Fitzmaurice, Fourth Report (n 26) 45-6, 66 [82], 70 [102].
82 Sicilianos (n 80) 1135.
83 Crawford (n 15) [91]; J Crawford, 'The Standing of States: A Critique of Article 40 of the ILC's Draft Articles
on State Responsibility' in D Fairgrieve (ed), Judicial Review in International Perspective: Liber Amicorum in
Honour of Lord Slynn of Hadley (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2000) 29-32 ('Crawford, The Standing
of States'); C Feist, Kundigung, Rucktritt und Suspendierung von multilateralen Vertriigen (Duncker & Humblot,
Berlin 2001) 49-52; Gomaa (n 27) 34-5; Simma, Reflections (n 15) 76; Sicilianos (n 80) 348.
84 See eg Fitzmaurice, Second Report (n 24) 54 [126] and n73.
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'integral') structure, responses cannot be restricted to relations between the defaulting
and responding party because the responding party's suspension would necessarily be
a violation of its obligation vis-a-vis all other (non-defaulting) parties. Article 60(2)(c)
spells out the implications of this 'global reciprocity' concept; and exceptionally allows for
responses by each and every treaty party.
As is clear from the preceding paragraphs, to lay down a general regime governing
standing to respond against breaches has been a considerable challenge. The ILC's debate
on what became Article 60 is relevant precisely because it marked one of the first occasions
at which the UN's main codification body discussed questions of standing in depth, and in
full awareness of the rise of multilateralism. Not surprisingly, then, Article 60's approach has
'spilled over' into subsequent attempts to formulate rules of standing, notably in the context
of the ILC's State responsibility project. That said, as much as it was a 'first: the ILC's Article
60 debates were also a 'last' in some respects. They reflect the international community's
approach to standing at a time when the key concepts giving expression to collective interests were only beginning to be considered. While a 'solidarity approach' was considered,
the drafters did not discuss public interest concepts such as obligations erga omnes (to be
defined, one year after the VCLT's adoption, as obligations in whose observance 'all States
can be held to have a legal interest'85 ), and they decided not to reflect the new category of
jus cogens within a regime governing standing against treaty breaches. On that basis, they
generally favoured a restrictive regime of standing, which remained premised on specially
sustained injury, resisting the temptation to turn Article 60 into an instrument of public
interest enforcement.

D. Procedural conditions governing the exercise of the right of response
A mere two years after the VCLT's opening for signature, the ICJ held that Article 60 might
'in many respects be considered as a codification of existing international law on the subject'.86 In line with this statement, the preceding discussion has treated Article 60 and
treaty-based responses under customary international law together. With respect to the
procedural conditions governing the exercise of the right, matters are different. The VCLT
subjects individual responses to treaty breaches to a cumbersome regime that, to date, has
not been applied; and customary international rules on treaty-based responses do not contain equivalent restrictions.
Article 60(1), 2(b), and 2(c) (ie those provisions addressing individual responses) expressly provide that the responding State is entitled to invoke the prior breach as a ground
for suspension or termination. 87 This formula clarifies that the Article 60 invocation
does not itself affect the treaty relationship, but that the legal effects of suspension or

85

Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v Spain) (Judgment) [1970) ICJ Rep 3, 32 [33 ].
Namibia case (n 30) 47 (94]-[95].
87
In the ILC's draft articles, this formula was used only for its versions of [l) and [2(b)); the ILC's version of
[2( c) I had entitled parties 'to suspend the operation of the treaty'. The inconsistency between [2(b)] and [2(c)] was
removed following a proposal by the United Kingdom. Vienna Conference, Official Records (n 34) 269 (quoting
UN Doc A/CONF.39/1.29); for the relevant debates see Vienna Conference, First Session (n 41) 478,484; Vienna
Conference, Second Session (n 27) 115.
86

584

AVOIDING OR EXITING TREATY COMMITMENTS

termination are only entailed according to the procedural rules of Articles 65-68 VCLT.88
A responding State's intention to suspend or terminate a treaty in whole or in part therefore only takes effect once the procedure of Articles 65-68 has been followed. 89 And this
is by no means a mere formality. Rather, these provisions envisage the notification of any
claims; the lapse of a three-month period during which other parties can protest; dispute
resolution by a method chosen by the responding and protesting parties; and, failing their
agreement on a mode of dispute resolution, a process of mandatory conciliation pursuant
to Annex 1 VCLT. 90
Predictably, the 'procedural straightjacket' set out in Articles 65-68 has not proved
particularly popular. States and other actors of international law have drawn a distinction between Article 6O's substantive aspects-which, by and large, they have applied as
customary international law-and its procedural implementation mechanism. In practice, this has meant that States affected by a material breach have suspended or terminated
treaties without instituting the VCLT's dispute settlement procedures. In line with that
understanding, the ICJ, in Armed Activities (DRC v Rwanda) expressly noted that Article
66 (providing for compulsory conciliation) was not 'declaratory of customary international law'. 91 In the Racke case, which concerned the parallel problem whether responses
based on the clausula rebus sic stantibus would require prior attempts at dispute settlement, the European Court of Justice adopted the same line of reasoning, holding that 'the
specific procedural requirements there laid down [ie in Article 65 VCLT] do not form part
of customary international law'. 92 While some decisions have taken a more favourable position,93 the more convincing view is that Articles 65-68 do not reflect general international
law. This in turn provides some justification for the approach of States just described: because of its temporal restrictions,94 and still rather modest ratifications record, 95 the VCLT
more often than not, is not applicable as treaty law, but merely insofar as it reflects custom.
As Articles 65-68 do not reflect custom, States enjoy considerable leeway in seeking to
avoid the cumbersome implementation procedure governing the exercise of the right to
suspend or terminate a treaty.96

88

Gomaa (n 27) 98.
Kirgis maintains that Arts 65-68 do not apply to partial suspension of treaties, as neither Art 65 nor Art 42(2)
referred to it. See Kirgis (n 36) 558. The argument is, however, not convincing, as the Art 60 formula 'to invoke as a
ground' is to be understood as a comprehensive reference to the procedure envisaged in Arts 65-68.
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For details, including on the dramatic debates surrounding the adoption of Arts 65 et seq, see I Sinclair, The
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2nd edn MUP, Manchester 1984) 226-33.
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Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v
Rwanda) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment) [2006] ICJ Rep 6, 51 [125].
92 Racke GmbH and Co v Hauptzollamt Mainz, Case C-162/96 [1998] ECR 1-3655, [52]-[59].
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See especially the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, where the ICJ's judgment noted that '[b]oth Parties agree[d]
that Articles 65 to 67 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, if not codifying customary law, at least
generally reflect customary international law and contain[ ed] certain procedural principles which are based on an
obligation to act in good faith: Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case (n 16) [109].
94 Cf Arts 4 and 84(2) VCLT (providing for non-retroactivity).
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Fifty years after its adoption, the Convention has been ratified, or acceded to, by 116 States (cf <https://
treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY &mtdsg_no=XXIII-1 &chapter=23&Temp=mtdsg3&cl
ang=_en>). Prominent 'non-ratifying' States include France, the United States, India, Iran, and Indonesia.
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For further comment on this point, see ME Villiger, Commentary on the J969 Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden 2009) 813-14; Verdross and Simma (n 47) [840]; J Verhoeven, 'Jus
Cogens and Reservations or "Counter-Reservations" to the Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice' in
K Wellens (ed), International Law: Theory and Practice; Essays in Honour ofEric Suy (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden
1998) 199-200.
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E. Interim conclusions
The preceding considerations suggest that Article 60 has shaped our thinking about responses against treaty breaches, but that it is not immune from criticism. Drafters were
keen to ensure that States would not lightly suspend (let alone terminate) treaties-hence
the requirement that the right to suspend/terminate presupposes a prior material breach,
the cumbersome conditions governing its exercise, the restriction of responses to the
treaty affected by the prior breach, and the rather cautious approach to standing. If one accepts the drafters' approach, one might wonder whether the notion of 'material breach'
ought not to have been defined differently, or why the scope of the right is not limited by a
proportionality test.
Yet, more fundamentally, it seems that the drafters may have lost sight of the necessary balance between the need to ensure the stability of treaties, while also permitting effective responses against breaches. Article 60 is really designed to address major ruptures
in treaty relations, but leaves the smaller, 'everyday' problems unaddressed. In hindsight,
the regime devised in Article 60 may well have been an over-ambitious attempt to 'civilize'
inter-State relations. Article 60 certainly achieves its aim-that is, to preserve the stability
of treaties. But by subjecting treaty suspension and termination to rather stringent conditions, the drafters inadvertently restricted Article 60's 'appeal' to States seeking to respond
against another State's treaty breaches. Not surprisingly, treaties adopted after the VCLT
have increasingly formulated treaty-specific rules on responses against breaches. And perhaps more importantly, with respect to general concepts, the VCLT's narrow approach has
meant that responding States intending to suspend treaty obligations have relied, not on
the general law of treaties, but on the law of State responsibility instead. Inadvertently, then,
Article 60's limited 'appeal' may have paved the way for a 'renaissance' of the concept of
countermeasures.

III. The Law of State Responsibility: Countermeasures
The second general concept permitting prima fade unlawful responses against treaty
breaches is that of countermeasures. The concept of countermeasures is situated within the
law of State responsibility and has been shaped by that doctrine rather than by the general
law of treaties. As noted earlier,97 conceptually, countermeasures follow a different rationale
than treaty-based responses based on Article 60: their aim is not to re-establish a balance
of rights among treaty partners, but to induce or compel the State responsible for a treaty
breach back into compliance. Compared to treaty-based responses, countermeasures are a
broader concept, and their regulation under international law is more flexible. In order to
bring out these features, this section clarifies the legal regime of countermeasures by comparing it to Article 60 treaty-based responses. This comparative approach will enable us to
highlight four main aspects of the countermeasures regime: (i) the possibility of resorting
to countermeasures against any treaty breach (as well as any other breach of international
law); (ii) the wide discretion of States in calibrating their response, limited largely by the

97

See nn 20-3 and accompanying text.
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requirement of proportionality; (iii) the different approach to the problem of standing; and
(iv) the decision not to submit countermeasures to far-reaching procedural preconditions.

A. The requirement of a prior breach
The first element is that in order to be justified, a countermeasure 'must be taken in response
to a previous international wrongful act of another State and must be directed against that
State:98 This is at times formulated as a limitation, indicating that it is not sufficient for the
responding State to consider international law to have been breached.99 And indeed, in
prescribing that there must be an actual breach, the international legal regime of countermeasures embraces an objective standard. This is fully in line with the overall legal regime
governing responses to wrongfulness, and should not be read to require an objective assessment of the situation by a third party. A responding State remains free to determine whether
there has been a breach, but it does so at its own risk. 100
From the comparative perspective adopted here, what stands out in this element is not
the decision to require the actual commission of a breach, but the fact that, unlike in the
law of treaties, any actual breach can be met by way of a countermeasure. There are two
aspects to this. First, the formulation very clearly brings out the breadth of the concept of
countermeasures, which is available against all 'previous international wrongful act[s] of
another State: including (but not limited to) treaty breaches. 101 Second, and more pertinently, unlike under Article 60, there is no threshold requirement. Countermeasures can be
taken against all treaty breaches, irrespective of their material character. This means that,
even within the field of treaty breaches, countermeasures have a wider scope of application
than treaty-based measures. Conversely, the decision to leave out any threshold requirement reinforces the need for limits on the scope of responses, notably through the concept
of proportionality.

B. The scope of the right to respond
The breadth of the concept of countermeasures is reflected in the rules governing the scope
of the right to resort to them. These rules are clearly influenced by the purpose of countermeasures as an instrument of law enforcement. Beyond that, moreover, countermeasures are characterized by their flexibility. Unlike treaty-based responses, States enjoy an
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Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case (n 16) 55 [83].
ASR (n 14) [3] (commentary to Art 49 ASR). Clarification of this point is often felt to be necessary, since the
Air Services arbitral award misleadingly stated that 'each State establishes for itselfits legal situation vis-a-vis other
States'. Case Concerning the Air Services Agreement of27 March 1946 [1978] 54 ILR 304, [81].
100 The matter is, of course, different if applicable rules make resort to countermeasures dependent upon some
form of authorization, such as within the WTO regime. CfWTO Dispute Settlement Understanding [1994] 33
ILM 1226, Annex 2, Art 22; WTO, United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974-Panel Report (22
December 1999) WT/DS152/R [7.35]-[7.46]. On procedural preconditions restricting the resort to countermeasures see nn 141-145 and accompanying text.
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This is in line with the international law approach to questions of responsibility generally, which does not
draw distinctions between breaches of treaty and breaches of general international law: cf ASR (n 14) Art 12
('There is a breach of an international obligation by a State when an act of that State is not in conformity with what
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extremely wide margin of discretion in choosing how to respond to treaty breaches via
countermeasures. This wide discretion in turn is limited by the overarching requirement
that countermeasures must be proportionate, as well as by a range of exclusionary clauses
protecting particularly important obligations. Against this background, the legal rules governing the scope of countermeasures can be presented in four steps.

1. Countermeasures focus on inducing compliance
As an enforcement concept, countermeasures must be taken for a specific purpose. They
must 'induce the wrongdoing State to comply with its obligations under international law.102
This limited function implies that countermeasures are not designed to alter the underlying
legal relationship between the responding and targeted State. Rather, they merely justify noncompliance with international law for an interim period and a specific purpose. 103 It follows
that countermeasures-notwithstanding the negative connotations of the traditional term
'reprisals'-are not an instrument of private vengeance and must not be used as a form of
punishment. 104
While firmly established conceptually (and indispensable as a matter oflegal policy), these
guidelines are rather difficult to translate into strict rules in practice. The prohibition against
punishment mainly goes to the State's motivation in adopting countermeasures. Unless
States go on record, 105 this motivation may often be difficult to police, especially since-like
punishment-countermeasures are by definition coercive. As for the interim character of
countermeasures, the general rule is that countermeasures be temporary and reversible.
But Article 49(3) ASR deliberately opts against any absolute approach, instead stating that
'[c]ountermeasures shall, as far as possible, be taken in such a way as to permit the resumption
of performance of the obligations in question' (emphasis added). 106 Even with this caveat, it is
clear that countermeasures only justify non-compliance as long as this is required to induce
compliance.107

2. Countermeasures are not limited to the treaty breached
It is with respect to the choice of obligations that can be violated that countermeasures
are most clearly different from treaty-based responses. Unlike Article 60 VCLT, the law of
countermeasures does not prescribe which obligations can be disregarded in order to induce the targeted State back into compliance. Subject to a number of exclusionary rules
(addressed later), this is a matter for the responding State to decide. There are two aspects to
this. First, given the general character of the concept, it is clear that countermeasures cannot
be restricted to the non-performance of obligations under the same treaty. Second, and less
obviously, international law has refrained from formulating special rules for responses that
affect obligations connected to the ones initially breached. 108 A responding State may no
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Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case (n 16) [85]. This is taken up in ASR (n 14) Art 49(1).
Cf ASR (n 14) Art 49(2) ('Countermeasures are limited to the non-performance for the time being of international obligations of the State taking the measures towards the responsible State').
104
Ibid 130 [l] (commentaryonArt49).
.
105
By way of illustration, see the discussions reflected in the ICJ's Interim Accord case (n 15) [120]-[122) and
[164 ], and for statements placed on record, [74]-[80].
106
For details see ASR (n 14) 131 [9]; Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case (n 16) [87].
107
This is expressly spelled out in ASR (n 14) Arts 52(3)(a), 53.
108
For a discussion of whether such 'reciprocal countermeasures' are subject to an autonomous regime see
Crawford (n 15) [327]-[329]. For an attempt to formulate autonomous rules cfW Riphagen, 'Sixth Report on State
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doubt choose to take such so-called 'reciprocal countermeasures: 109 but the legal regime of
countermeasures does not require it to do so, nor indeed does it subject reciprocal countermeasures to a special legal regime. 110 As a consequence, the circle of obligations that can be
disregarded by way of countermeasures is much wider than those affected by treaty-based
responses. A responding State can respond against treaty breaches notably by violating its
obligations towards the targeted State under other treaties, or indeed under general international law. For example, a breach of a bilateral treaty on economic cooperation may be
met with economic sanctions violating WTO law, just as violations of diplomatic immunity
may prompt the freezing of assets. The law of countermeasures does not presuppose any
nexus, or requirement of qualitative proportionality, 111 between the initial violation and
the response thereto. This flexibility, in turn, reinforces the need for some limitations on
the response, which are found in exclusionary clauses and the overarching requirement of
proportionality.

3. Proportionality: countermeasures must be commensurate with the injury suffered
Proportionality-in its 'quantitative' variant112-is the key substantive criterion limiting
the exercise of the right to take countermeasures. It is a common limitation on responses
against wrongfulness and a crucial element in the quest to 'tame' countermeasures. Its application to the law of countermeasures raises few conceptual problems: what is required is
a comparison between the effects of the initial breach and the responding State's reaction.
In the words of the ICJ (endorsed by the ILC), 'the effects of a countermeasure must be
commensurate with the injury suffered'. 113 This indeed is a necessary limitation, one instrumental to ensuring that countermeasures do not become measures of punishment and
which helps keep its results acceptable. As the ILC's work clarifies, the proportionality comparison is primarily between the levels of injury (ie quantitative), but also the importance of
the interest protected by the rule infringed and the seriousness of the breach. 114
While relatively unproblematic conceptually, the application of proportionality poses
two problems. First, because States have discretion in choosing which obligations they intend to disregard to induce the targeted State back into compliance, any proportionality
analysis may involve a comparison between 'disparate integers' 115 or 'apples and oranges'. 116
This is not a specific problem of countermeasures, but rather one that affects many fields of
proportionality analysis. However, the fact that States enjoy a large measure of discretion

Responsibility' [1985] YBILC, vol 11(1), 10 (draft Art 8 of Part Two, drawing on PCIJ's judgment in Diversion of
Water from the Meuse [1937] PCIJ Rep Series A/B No 70, 4, 50, 77).
109

See eg the Air Services arbitration (n 99) 304.
uo See egASR(n 14) 128-9 [4]-[5].
111
Cf the terminology used at nn 52-54 and accompanying text.
112 Ibid.
113
ASR (n 14) Art 51. This goes back to the ICJ's judgment in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case (n 16) [85]-[87].
For earlier attempts to formulate versions of a proportionality requirement, cf Air Services arbitration (n 99) [83]
('It is generally agreed that all counter-measures must, in the first instance, have some degree of equivalence with
the alleged breach'); Naulilaa Award (1930) 2 RIAA 1011, 1028 ('[Elven if one were to admit that the law ofnations
does not require that the reprisal should be approximately in keeping with the offence, one should certainly consider as excessive and therefore unlawful reprisals out of all proportion to the act motivating them').
4
"
ASR(n 14) 135 [6] (commentarytoArt51).
ll5 T Franclc, 'On Proportionality of Countermeasures in International Law' (2008) 102 AJIL 715, 729.
6
"
M Schmitt, 'Fault Lines in the Law of Attack' in S Breau and A Jachec-Neale (eds), Testing the Boundaries of
International Law (BIICL, London 2006) 293.
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in choosing which obligations to 'target' by way of countermeasures renders it particularly
acute. To illustrate, consider the fictitious example of a State responding to a prior violation
of an FCN Treaty by adopting a travel ban. The two acts are so different that it is not easy to
assess their equivalence. Second, the absence of a regular scrutiny procedure further complicates matters. As shown later, as a matter of principle, countermeasures are not subject
to any form of prior authorization or independent assessment; like other private responses,
they are to be taken by the responding State on the basis of its own ( auto )assessment of the
situation. 117
Both problems, taken together, limit the effectiveness of a proportionality test in taming
countermeasures-but they do not render it pointless. Quite to the contrary, in the absence of regular independent assessments, it is the unorganized international legal community that evaluates responses, through statements, protests, or approval (whether tacit
or express). In its evaluation, the community is guided by occasional pronouncements
by international courts and tribunals, which-notwithstanding the absence of regular judicial scrutiny-have assessed the proportionality of countermeasures in cases such as
Naulilaa, Air Services, and Gabcikovo. 118 Based on these pronouncements, international
practice, and clarification exercises like the ILC's work on State responsibility, the notion
of proportionality-it is submitted-offers at least a benchmark for scrutinizing responses
and acts as a restraint in clear-cut cases. 119

4. Countermeasures must not affect obligations under rules ofjus cogens
and dispute settlement procedures
Finally, beyond the overarching requirement of proportionality, international law shields
a number of particularly important obligations from the application of countermeasures.
Within the ILC's text, these exclusions are spelled out in Article 50 ASR. They follow the
same logic as the exclusionary clause of Article 60(5) VCLT, but (having been adopted in
2001) are more up-to-date with contemporary international law. 120 In essence, two categories of obligations are 'ringfenced' against countermeasures. First, countermeasures do
not justify the non -performance of obligations imposed by rules of jus cogens. This takes
account of the fact that modern international law accepts jus cogens effects beyond the
VCLT 121 and that fundamental substantive interests protected by the concept cannot be
opted out of unilaterally. 122 It follows that obligations flowing from recognized peremptory
rules-notably the duty not to use force in violation of the UN Charter, or obligations under
peremptory rules of human rights law or international humanitarian law-must not be the
subject of countermeasures.
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Seenn 141-145 and accompanying text.
See Nau/ilaa Award (n 113) 1101; Air Services arbitration (n 99) 304; Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case (n 16) 7,
respectively.
119 Cf Franck (n 115) 764.
120 Contrast the authors' more sceptical analysis of Art 60(5) at nn 59-65 and accompanying text.
121 Within the ILC's text on State responsibility, see notably ASR (n 14) Arts 26, 40-1. For an early and balanced study of these and other instances, see G Gaja, 'Jus Cogens Beyond the Vienna Convention' (1981) 172 RdC
273. For an ambitious attempt to 'peremptorize' broad areas of international law, see A Orekhelasbvili, Peremptory
Norms in International Law (OUP, Oxford 2006).
122 In the words of the ILC, '[e]vidently, a peremptory norm, not subject to derogation as between two States
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(Commentary to Art SO).
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Second, good reasons suggest that countermeasures may not affect obligations that were
agreed precisely to peacefully resolve disputes between the responding State and the targeted State. This implies that, as the JCJ put it in the !CAO Council case when speaking
about treaty suspension, 'a merely unilateral suspension [cannot] per se render jurisdictional clauses inoperative, since one of their purposes might be, precisely, to enable the validity of the suspension to be tested: 123 It follows that where States are bound by dispute
settlement provisions covering the dispute in question, the responding State is not relieved
from fulfilling these obligations when resorting to countermeasures. 124 According to the
ILC, the same rationale applies to minimum obligations designed to ensure the inviolability
of diplomatic and consular immunities. Following this argument-which draws some support from the ICJ's Tehran Hostages judgment125-countermeasures ought not to affect the
existence of basic channels of communication since they may be a conduit for the resolution
of the dispute. 126

C. Standing to take countermeasures
Given the broad character of the concept, the identification of States entitled to resort to
countermeasures assumes particular importance. Not surprisingly, there is much debate
about 'standing to take countermeasures: The ILC's work on State responsibility-which
addresses the matter within the framework of the rules governing the implementation of
responsibility-has helped clarify some of the issues, but leaves open one crucial question.
The regime set out in Articles 42 and 49 of the ILC's text to a large extent follows the VCLT
rules on standing to suspend or terminate treaties, while Article 54 points to an unresolved
question ignored by Article 60 VCLT.
Articles 42 and 49 ASR deal with standing on the basis of the acquis of agreed rules devised in Article 60 VCLT, whose approach-as noted earlier-has 'spilled over' into the law
of State responsibility. 127 In essence, these provisions recognize the right of States to resort to countermeasures if the obligation breached was owed to them bilaterally or if the
breach of a multilateral obligation 'specially affected' them (because of the quasi-bilateral
structure of performance or because the wrongful act had produced specific, individualized consequences). 128 What is more, the standing regime set out in the ASR follows Article
60 even into the muddy terrain of integral obligations. 129 Taking up the rationale of 'global
reciprocity' 130 informing Article 60(2)(c) VCLT, Article 42(b)(ii) ASR accepts that where
123

Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council (India v Pakistan) [1972] ICJ Rep 46, 53.
ASR (n 14) Art50(2)(a).
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United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (1980] ICJ Rep 3, 38-40 (83]-(86] (misleadingly
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See Section II.C, 579-83 et seq. During the course of its second reading on State responsibility, the ILC
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(n 83) 23.
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an interdependent/integral obligation has been breached'[ t]he other States parties ... must
all be considered as individually entitled to react to a breach: including by means of
countermeasures. 131
In another respect, however, debates about standing to take countermeasures have
moved beyond the Vienna Convention acquis. There is much debate about a new version
of the 'solidarity approach' 132 to questions of standing-namely the question whether
States could resort to countermeasures in order to defend collective interests protected
by treaties dealing with humanitarian matters or other public policy concerns. 133 These
renewed discussions are part of a more general debate about the right of individual States
to act as guardians of collective interests. 134 Given the crucial role of multilateral treaties
as 'workhorses of community interest: 135 this general debate directly implicates the legal
regime(s) governing responses to treaty breaches. The international community has yet
to reach agreement on this matter, but developments since the mid-1960s (when the
VCLT rules were drafted) point in favour of allowing 'solidarity measures' under certain
circumstances.
More specifically, in its 1970 judgment in the Barcelona Traction case, the !CJ recognized
that all States can be held to have a legal interest in seeing certain fundamental rules complied with (which it termed obligations erga omnes). 136 Since 1970, States have accepted
the rationale behind this erga omnes dictum and, on a number of occasions, have taken
countermeasures in response to grave and systematic breaches of collective interest provisions.137 In its work on State responsibility, the ILC considered these instances to be too
sporadic to amount to a settled practice, and was cautious not to endorse expressly a right
of individual States, irrespective of any individual injury, to take 'solidarity measures'. 138
However, it did embrace the idea of collective interest enforcement in Article 48 of its text
and accepted that a practice was emerging. 139 Other bodies, such as the Institut de droit
international have (rightly) gone beyond the ILC's approach and recognized that where a
State is responsible for a 'widely acknowledged grave breach of' a treaty protecting obligations erga omnes, 'all the States to which the obligation is owed: ... are entitled to take nonforcible counter-measures under conditions analogous to those applying to a State specially
affected by the breach: 140 Indeed, this last position seems to reflect the current state of the
law and marks the acceptance of a modest version of the solidarity approach within the law
of countermeasures.
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D. Procedural conditions governing the exercise of
the right to countermeasures
1he question remains whether States seeking to resort to countermeasures need to comply
with procedural requirements. Just as with treaty-based measures, this is a matter of some
controversy. 141 From a policy perspective, the imposition of procedural conditions has
seemed to many to be the best way of taming the archaic countermeasures concept. During
the first reading of the ILC's work on State responsibility, the ILC's Special Rapporteur
Arangio Ruiz submitted far-reaching proposals in this respect. He proposed to require
the prior exhaustion 'of all the amicable settlement procedures available under general
international law, the United Nations Charter or any other dispute settlement instrument
to which [a State seeking redress] is a party' and a system for 'post-countermeasures' dispute settlement. 142 1hese proposals certainly marked one of the high-points of attempts
to 'civilize' the private enforcement of international law, but they proved overly ambitious.
Stressing the legitimacy of countermeasures (which were a fact oflife and served to uphold
the rule oflaw), States and commentators responded by arguing for a leaner regime, which
would balance the interests of responding and targeted States in a more nuanced way. 143
Debates eventually resulted in Article 52 ASR, which requires responding States to give 'advance warning' to the targeted State and provide it with an opportunity to respond to the
claims underlying the dispute. 144
Beyond this minimum requirement, Article 52 deliberately refrains from making resort
to countermeasures dependent on the prior exhaustion of further dispute settlement procedures (nor does it establish mechanisms for 'post-countermeasures' dispute settlement).
It does, however, recognize the primacy of third party dispute resolution in two settings.
First, it affirms that comprehensive dispute settlement systems can exclude the availability
of coercive self-help altogether. Second, it excludes resorting to countermeasures in situations in which the underlying dispute is pending before a court or tribunal, with the caveat
that where the dispute settlement process breaks down, the right to take countermeasures
revives.1hese safeguards are complemented by the provision-mentioned above, as part of
the exclusionary clauses 145-that countermeasures must not affect dispute settlement obligations agreed between the disputing parties. Taken together, it would seem that the more
modest system devised by the ILC indeed preserves existing institutionalized dispute settlement without 'choking' countermeasures.
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Conclusion
The legal regime governing countermeasures differs markedly from the treaty law rules
permitting the suspension or termination of treaties in response to breaches. Mindful not
to lay down overly restrictive rules that States would merely circumvent, the international
community's 'agents' oflegal development-the ILC, States in their comments on the ILC's
work, and international courts and tribunals-have devised a regime that is considerably
more flexible than that of Article 60, and which permits the suspension of treaty obligations
under less stringent conditions. The divergence can be explained by reference to differences
between the enforcement concept of countermeasures, on the one hand, and the defensive
concept of treaty law responses on the other. But presumably, they are also a reflection of a
more sceptical approach towards over-ambitious attempts to civilize inter-State relations.
As the more flexible general concept permitting coercive responses against treaty breaches,
countermeasures thus still retain their role as an important feature of the international regime governing response against treaty breaches.
If, nevertheless, even resort to the more flexible concept of countermeasures today is rather rare, then this reflects the increasing prominence of treaty-specific regimes providing
for 'tailor-made' rules on responses against treaty breaches. Modern treaty regimes in fields
such as international environmental law, arms control, or human rights law have reached a
degree of sophistication that general legal concepts (like countermeasures or treaty law responses) simply cannot match. If we may be permitted to adapt a well-known statement by
a well-known international lawyer, coercive responses to treaty breaches-whether justified
as countermeasures or under Article 60 VCLT-today seem to be 'vehicle[s] that hardly
ever leav[ e] the garage~ 146 Yet, like rarely used vehicles, they do remain around, ready to be
taken out for the occasional trip, when the circumstances so require. Thus, they should not
be discarded lightly.
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